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I. INTRODUCTION
When something is true or valuable, we can often give a
simple account of why this is so. There may be some single rea-
son or some overwhelming item of evidence that underlies the
truth or value in question. Even if we think that there are sev-
eral different reasons why something is true or valuable, one of
those reasons standing alone may establish the point.
We might, for example, sufficiently account for the truth of
our belief that it suddenly became dark by noting that someone
just flicked the light switch. Under other circumstances, we
might point instead to the onset of a solar eclipse. These simple
explanations are not complete in themselves, but they may be
all we need.
By analogy, we might point to some single devastating
piece of incriminating evidence-perhaps a confession or a fin-
gerprint on the trigger of the murder weapon-as decisive in
establishing a defendant's legal guilt. At the constitutional
level, we might think of carefully promoting some single public
interest as potentially sufficient, perhaps along with other legal
requirements, to justify a government policy.
Thus, preserving the tranquility of a residential neighbor-
hood may justify some sorts of restrictions on speech.' Discour-
aging street crime might be thought to justify other restrictions
on speech. 2 Financial difficulties faced disproportionately by
widows may, under the circumstances, justify differential tax
treatment of widows and widowers. 3 Generally, arguably une-
qual treatment of men and women may be justified if an impor-
tant government interest is at stake.4 Other legal requirements
may need to be met in these cases, but no underlying reason
other than the single specified government interest need be
cited.
In some cases in which a race or ethnic group has uninten-
tionally been affected adversely by a government policy, the pol-
icy can be justified if, among other requirements, it promotes
1. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949).
2. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986).
3. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 353-55 (1974).
4. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996); Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
[Vol. 23:1
20021 CUMULATIVE CASE LEGAL ARGUMENTS 3
some legitimate public interest.5 On the other hand, intentional
differential treatment of individuals based on race may be justi-
fiable only if, among other requirements, a compelling govern-
mental interest is at stake.6  Complications aside,7  a
government policy 8 is generally constitutionally justifiable only
if there is some sufficient governmental or public interest un-
derlying that policy. This interest can range from the merely
legitimate to the genuinely compelling.
Debates over the presence or absence of a sufficient govern-
mental or public interest are central to constitutional law. In
particular, cases of alleged governmental racial discrimination,
including challenges to racial and ethnic academic affirmative
action programs, 9 typically focus at least on locating a compel-
ling or otherwise sufficient government interest, if not on the
degree of tailoring or fit between the scope of the government
policy and the government interest. The judicial hunt for one or
more 10 sufficient, and perhaps compelling, government inter-
ests in such cases is central to contemporary constitutional ju-
risprudence. Without some sufficiently vital state interest, the
governmental policy cannot survive judicial challenge.
5. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
6. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
7. We set aside here issues of tailoring, or the degree of fit between the scope
or severity of the government policy's adverse effects and the governmental inter-
ests thought to justify the policy in question.
8. For simplicity and convenience, we will assume that the legal challenge is
brought against the government, for a constitutional violation, and not against
merely private actors. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
The basic theses of this article could be extended to actions against private parties
for non-constitutional claims. Our focus on governmental race-based affirmative
action is thus, in a sense, merely a narrow example, but obviously an extremely
important one, as a practical matter.
9. See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 200; Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265 (1978). We shall take the term "affirmative action" herein to refer to
the particulars of any specific program at issue, rather than attempt to define "af-
firmative action" so as to include all relevant programs and exclude all others. For
an expression of general concern over the use of the term "affirmative action," see
Carl Cohen, Is Affirmative Action on the Way Out?, 105 COMMENTARY 21 (March 1,
1998).
10. The courts quite realistically recognize that more than one alleged state
interest may be thought to justify a given state policy. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (discussing various purported justifications for a one year
residency requirement for welfare eligibility, and finding none sufficient). Typi-
cally, though, in such cases, the courts still look for a state interest that by itself
would suffice, independent of the other possible justifications. See, e.g., id.
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However, often this judicial search for some sufficient, and
perhaps compelling, government interest is misguided and in-
appropriate; our ordinary experience and ordinary reasoning
processes suggest as much. Often, our own decision-making im-
plicitly, and quite properly, rejects what we might call the suffi-
cient particular interest model of judicial decision-making.
Frequently, we do not seek out some single sufficient reason to
choose or justify a personal course of action. Nor is there, as we
shall see, any logical need to seek out such a single sufficient
reason.
The best way to see the distortedness of the sufficient par-
ticular interest model is to focus on an alternative model of deci-
sion-making and justification. We will focus herein on what are
referred to as cumulative case arguments. Admittedly, the idea
of a cumulative case argument or more simply, a cumulative
argument, is not entirely precise. 1 Cumulative case arguments
arise in ordinary life and in contexts ranging from literary criti-
cism, 12 history,1 3 politics, 14 and law'5 to the promotion 16 and cri-
tique17 of religious claims. Roughly, the idea is that a belief or
value may be establishable, to any degree of certainty, by
means other than that of a single item of evidence in its favor
standing in isolation. We may be able to establish a belief or
value, to any degree of certainty, only through the somehow
combined force of a number of different items of evidence, each
of which, by itself, may lack real power to persuade.
This is not to say that a large number and variety of bad
arguments add up to one good overall argument. Several differ-
11. See J.C. Thomas, Cumulative Arguments for Religious Belief, 21 SOPHIA
37, 37 (1982) ("[Cloncepts of what a cumulative argument is ... show[ ] a family
resemblance rather than an identity of form.").
12. See id. at 42.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See J. Ralph Lindgren, Criminal Responsibility Reconsidered, 6 L. & PHIL.
89 (1987) (developing a cumulative case for a particular normative theory of crimi-
nal responsibility).
16. See, e.g., Michael L. Diamond, A Modern Theistic Argument, 6 MOD. THE-
OLOGY 287 (1990); Keith J. Cooper, Scientific Method and the Appraisal of Religion,
21 RELIGIOUS STUD. 319 (1985) (discussing the cumulative case argument to the
best explanation developed by Richard Swinburne).
17. See J.C.A. Gaskin, The Design Argument: Hume's Critique of Poor Reason,
12 RELIGIOUS STUD. 331 (1976) (Hume's varied arguments against design as not in
any particular decisive but cogent when taken cumulatively).
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ent bad arguments combined may still be jointly unconvincing.
A false belief might be inadequately supported by different lines
of argument. By analogy, we often cannot carry water in a
leaky bucket merely by placing that leaky bucket inside a nest
of one or more other leaky buckets.' 8 The water may continue
to leak. One leaky bucket may not somehow make up for an-
other leaky bucket, and the joint argument may still not hold
water.
But some leaky buckets, or by analogy, individual compo-
nents of an overall argument, can sometimes be arranged in
such a way as to complement one another, so as to minimize or
even negate the defects of one or more of the buckets. In some
cases, by more or less careful arrangement, the overall spill rate
from the individually leaky buckets can be reduced to zero. It is
as though we had a non-leaky bucket.
This analogy rightly suggests that in assessing the
strength of a cumulative case argument, we cannot focus on the
weaknesses of any individual component of the overall cumula-
tive argument. But we also need not go so far as to take the
term "cumulative" literally, so as to suggest that later elements
of the overall argument must literally incorporate all of the ear-
lier elements. Instead, the various elements of the overall cu-
mulative argument may focus on separate matters or on similar
matters from different angles.
The elements of a cumulative case argument may nest co-
zily or not at all. They may work toward a single conclusion
through direct substantive mutual reinforcement. We may
think of this particular kind of cumulative case argument as
synergistic. Less dynamically, a cumulative case argument
might also work merely through the force or weight of the sepa-
rate arguments merely added together. Not all cumulative case
arguments need to work in the same way.
The idea that the elements of a cumulative case argument
may focus on separate aspects of a question often strengthens
18. See RICHARD SWINBURNE, THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 15 n.1 (1979); Thomas,
supra note 11, at 41. For further discussion, see BASIL MITCHELL, THE JUSTIFICA-
TION OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF 39-40 (1981) (responding to the "leaky bucket" argument
with the observation that "[w]hat has been taken to be a series of failures when
treated as attempts at purely deductive or inductive argument could well be better
understood as contributions to a cumulative case").
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the overall argument. 19 By analogy, if we are testing the gen-
eral theory of relativity, we can be more confident in the truth
of the theory if we have tested the theory from a variety of dif-
ferent angles, rather than by concentrating, however inge-
niously, on some single aspect of the theory.20 Furthermore,
particularly in legal matters, the distinct elements of a cumula-
tive case argument may appeal in different degrees to persons
with different background beliefs.21
Importantly, some cumulative cases may not depend cru-
cially upon each one of their constituent elements, as a tripod
might depend upon each of its legs.22 If any one leg of a tripod is
defective, the tripod collapses. But some cumulative case argu-
ments involve what we may call persuasive redundancy, so that
the collapse of one component of the argument may not much
affect the cogency and persuasiveness of the overall argument.23
Cumulative case arguments often do not take the form of a
chain, the breaking of any single link of which breaks the entire
chain. Some persons might reject one or more elements of the
cumulative case argument, yet still reasonably accept the
conclusion.
Thus, cumulative case arguments have certain advantages.
But we must not forget that cumulative case arguments typi-
cally rise to prominence only in the absence of any single, by
itself, satisfactory argument or value. If there were a simpler
way of reaching some result or of justifying some policy, we
would surely prefer such a route to the complications of a cumu-
lative case argument.
As well, we must be alert to possible misuse of cumulative
case arguments. Once we build a cumulative case legal argu-
ment, we of course cannot consider that case in contrast merely
19. See Thomas, supra note 11, at 40.
20. See id.
21. See, e.g., Philip L. Quinn, Divine Command Theory, in THE BLACKWELL
GUIDE TO ETHICAL THEORY 53, 57 (Hugh LaFollette ed., 2000).
22. See id. (analogizing his cumulative case argument to the legs of a chair).
23. By analogy, discrediting one element of a circumstantial evidence-based
murder case may not do much to undermine the sense of an overall case estab-
lished beyond reasonable doubt. That the cigarette butt might well have been left
on the scene earlier by the gardener, rather than by the defendant, may or may not
weaken appreciably the overall case against the defendant.
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with some especially unappealing alternative. 24 Nor can we
"double count" arguments or improperly discount arguments
supporting conclusions for which we do not care. 25 Nor should
we improperly manipulate the level of generality with which we
formulate our cumulative case elements in order to minimize
criticism. 26
But since components of a cumulative case argument can
strengthen or, less happily, weaken one another,27 the opponent
of a cumulative case argument must not improperly "divide and
rule"28 by treating the arguments29 separately, and then pro-
nouncing none of them sufficient by itself. Considering individ-
ual component arguments in isolation may help clarify each
component argument in itself, but such isolation may crucially
distort the overall nature, structure, and strength of the com-
bined argument. 30 The overall cumulative case argument, even
where each individual element is not by itself of overwhelming
weight, may be just as strong as an argument relying solely on a
single decisive consideration.
We should emphasize that cumulative case arguments can
be used to establish not just minimal probability, but near cer-
tainty as well. A cumulative case argument in the law might be
developed to establish some claim by a mere preponderance of
the evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt. 31 This is a matter of
reaching some required degree of certainty.
24. See Charles E. Gutenson, What Swinburne Should Have Concluded, 33
RELIGIOUS STUD. 243, 245-46 (1997) (by way of loose analogy).
25. See generally id.
26. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Grammar, 72
TEx. L. REV. 1771, 1799 (1994) ("A historical situation or practice . . . can be de-
scribed in different ways and at different levels of generality.").
27. See SWINBURNE, supra note 18, at 13.
28. See id.
29. Of course, it would be similarly improper to distort a hypothetical cumula-
tive case argument against affirmative action, but the current litigation of concern
to us is mainly a matter of the proponent of affirmative action trying to build a
case. Typically, this is done by means of finding a compelling government interest
and narrow tailoring. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200
(1995).
30. See SWINBURNE, supra note 18, at 13.
31. See. e.g., United States v. DuPuy, 760 F.2d 1492, 1500 (9th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Staten, 581 F.2d 878, 886 n.71 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Toney v. State,
572 So. 2d 1308, 1315 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990); Carlisle v. State, 533 So. 2d 645, 650
(Ala. Crim. App. 1988); People v. Ruiz, 72 Cal. Rptr. 572, 575 (1998); Moss v. State,
10 S.W.3d 508, 512 n.13 (Mo. 2000); State v. Cort, 766 A.2d 260, 266, (N.H. 2000);
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However, quite apart from this, cumulative case arguments
can also be used to show, for example, that some goal is valua-
ble, or that the goal is overwhelmingly valuable. The limits to
the degree of value that cumulative case arguments can estab-
lish are set only by the merits of the argument itself. There is
no reason why the most overridingly important or compelling
public interest we can imagine could not be best shown only by
a cumulative case constitutional argument.
II. UNDERSTANDING CUMULATIVE CASE
ARGUMENTS IN GENERAL
We may think of cumulative case arguments by analogy to
a classic circumstantial evidence legal case. Circumstantial evi-
dence is typically contrasted with direct evidence. 32 Direct evi-
dence suggests immediate knowledge or direct perception of a
fact, 33 whereas circumstantial evidence suggests the need for
some sort of inferential process. 34 Actually, all evidence re-
quires some sort of inference, if not on the part of a witness, at
least on the part of the jury.35 But it is not the mere inferential
character of circumstantial evidence that is most interestingly
analogous to cumulative case arguments.
Instead, the classic circumstantial evidence case is often
structurally akin to a typical cumulative case argument. A cir-
cumstantial evidence case may actually be focused on some sin-
State v. Brennan, 970 P.2d 161, 165 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998); People v. Sanchez, 463
N.E.2d 1228, 1229 (N.Y. 1984); State v. Grippon, 489 S.E.2d 462, 464 (S.C. 1977).
32. See, e.g., People v. Sanchez, 463 N.E.2d 1228, 1229 (N.Y. 1984); Irene
Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, "Perhaps What Ye Say Is Based Only On
Conjecture"-Circumstantial Evidence, Then and Now, 31 Hous. L. REV. 1371
(1995); Daniel P. Collins, Note, Summary Judgment and Circumstantial Evidence,
40 STAN. L. REV. 491 (1988).
33. See, e.g., State v. Grippon, 489 S.E.2d 462, 464 (S.C. 1977) ("Direct evi-
dence is the testimony of a person who asserts ... actual knowledge of a fact, such
as an eyewitness. Circumstantial evidence is proof of a chain of facts and circum-
stances indicating the existence of a fact.").
34. See, e.g., Albert J. Moore, Inferential Streams: The Articulation and Illus-
tration of the Trial Advocate's Evidentary Intuitions, 34 UCLA L. REV. 611, 613
(1987) ("[C]ircumstantial evidence permits the jury to infer that the advocate has
established one or more legal elements she is attempting to prove.") (citation
omitted).
35. But see id. at 618. ("Direct evidence is evidence which proves or disproves,
without the need for an inference, an element which a party must establish.").
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gle piece of evidence 36 that is thought by itself to establish a
case beyond a reasonable doubt.37 But more classically, we
think of a circumstantial evidence case in terms of an accumu-
lation of more or less separate items of evidence. 38 Thus, such a
cumulative circumstantial case is built on some sort of aggrega-
tion of several pieces of evidence.
The cumulative nature of the classic circumstantial evi-
dence case is unfortunately obscured by the fact that the techni-
cal term "cumulative evidence" already has an established,
unfavorable meaning in the law. Cumulative evidence in this
standard legal sense is thought to be redundant and, thus, per-
haps inconsequential and excludable. 39 As we have been using
the term "cumulative case argument," of course, we do not in-
tend to suggest any sort of redundancy. We mean to suggest
instead quite the opposite of redundancy.
More helpfully, the courts have recognized that it is possi-
ble to build a successful circumstantial evidence case out of va-
rious items of evidence, each of which may be of only minimal
weight by itself. The courts have appreciated that
"[c]ircumstantial evidence sufficient to support a jury's finding
of guilt may be found in the accumulation of several relatively
insignificant pieces of evidence .... 40 No single piece of circum-
stantial 41 evidence by itself need be sufficient to meet the re-
36. See, e.g., United States v. DuPuy, 760 F.2d 1492, 1500 (9th Cir. 1985)
(quoting United States v. Morando-Alvarez, 520 F.2d 882, 884-85 (9th Cir. 1975)).
37. See, e.g., Sanchez, 63 N.E.2d at 1229; State v. Grippon, 489 S.E.2d 462,
464 (S.C. 1977).
38. See, e.g., DuPuy, 760 F.2d at 1500 (quoting Morando-Alvarez, 520 F.2d at
884-85).
39. See, e.g., People v. Ruiz, 72 Cal. Rptr. 572, 575 (1998); Moss v. State, 10
S.W.3d 508, 512 n.13 (Mo. 2000); State v. Cort, 766 A.2d 260, 266 (N.H. 2000);
State v. Brennan, 970 P.2d 161, 165 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998).
40. DuPuy, 760 F.2d at 1500 (quoting Morando-Alvarez, 520 F.2d 882, 884-85
(9th Cir. 1975)); United States v. Staten, 581 F.2d 878, 886 n.71 (D.C. Cir. 1978);
Toney v. State, 572 So. 2d 1308, 1315 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990); Carlisle v. State, 533
So. 2d 645, 650 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988).
41. It is certainly possible as well that only a cumulation of items of direct, as
opposed to circumstantial, evidence might suffice in a given case, but we simply do
not as readily think of pure direct evidence cases as analogous to a cumulative case
argument. A legal case in which only a combination of direct and circumstantial
evidence sufficed to meet the required legal standard could also serve to model a
cumulative case argument.
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quired legal standard,42 which may be as demanding as showing
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.43
The analogy between cumulative case legal arguments and
the use of circumstantial legal evidence teaches two important
lessons. First, it is possible for a successful legal case to be built
from component parts, no single one44 of which need by itself
meet the ultimately applicable legal standard.45 Second, cases
in which no single argument, or no single item of evidence, is by
itself especially persuasive, may meet even the most demanding
legal standards.46
To further clarify the nature of cumulative case legal argu-
ments, we may draw a somewhat more technical analogy. Phi-
losophers distinguish, in several subject matter areas, between
coherentist theories and foundationalist theories. The theories
may be of truth,47 meaning,48 knowledge, 49 epistemic justifica-
42. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Todaro, 701 A.2d 1343, 1345 (Pa. 1977) (quot-
ing trial court instructions); Commonwealth v. Pursell, 495 A.2d 183, 195 (Pa.
1985) (quoting trial court instructions) ("If there are several pieces of circumstan-
tial evidence, it is not necessary that each piece standing separately convince you
of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.").
43. See, e.g., Todaro, 701 A.2d at 1345; Pursell, 495 A.2d at 195.
44. It is possible that in a given case, no proper subset of all of the items of
circumstantial evidence, or no combination of evidence short of the entirety of the
evidence, would suffice to meet the legal standard. Generally, though, we need not
think about this even more extreme kind of cumulative case in order to see the
arbitrariness of requiring some single compelling government interest in constitu-
tional cases.
45. See sources cited supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., Todaro, 701 A.2d at 1345; Pursell, 495 A.2d at 195. See also State
v. Grippon, 489 S.E.2d 462, 464 (S.C. 1977) (quoting 1 E. DEVTT & C. BLAcKMAR,
FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 12.04 (4th ed. 1992)); People v.
Sanchez, 463 N.E.2d 1228, 1229 (N.Y. 1984) ("While it is not necessary that the
words 'moral certainty' be used, when the evidence is circumstantial the jury
should be instructed in substance that it must appear that the inference of guilt is
the only one that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from the facts, and that the
evidence excludes beyond a reasonable doubt every reasonable hypothesis of
innocence.").
47. See, e.g., Laurence Bonjour, The Coherence Theory of Empirical Knowl-
edge, 30 PHIL. STUD. 281, 281 (1976); Nicholas Rescher, Truth as Ideal Coherence,
38 REV. METAPHYSICS 795, 795 (1985); Ken Kress, Why No Judge Should Be a
Dworkinian Coherentist, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1375, 1380-81 (1999); Michael Williams,
Coherence, Justification, and Truth, 34 REV. METAPHYSICS 243, 245 (1980).
48. See, e.g., Bonjour, supra note 47, at 281.
49. See id.; Keith Lehrer, The Coherence Theory of Knowledge, 14 PHIL. TOPICS
5, 5 (1986).
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tion or warrantedness of belief,50 morality,5 1 or of law and adju-
dication.5 2 Coherentist theories, as the term is used by
philosophers, vary in their description, and specifying the very
idea of coherence is, itself, a problem. Roughly, foundational-
ism tends to take one or more beliefs or perceptions as basic or
given, intrinsically credible, or directly evident. 53 Coherentism,
on the other hand, is thought to be somehow more cross-referen-
tial, holistic, or web-like, 54 in that no single belief is thought to
be indubitable or otherwise privileged.
Coherentism would thus suggest a focus not on any single
knock-down argument but on some sort of mutual supportive-
ness among arguments, 55 with the network of arguments as a
whole being stronger than the individually inadequate compo-
nent arguments. This idea is captured by Professor Ken Kress'
metaphor for coherence as a collection of identically-shaped
puzzle pieces arranged in such a way as to jointly produce a
meaningful picture.56 However, no single sort of relationship
need exist among the individual component arguments.5 7 The
individual component arguments may be related to each other
in different ways, some more closely than others.
Of course, we need not claim here that coherentism offers
the best understanding of truth, meaning, knowledge, justified
belief, morality, or the law. Instead, we focus merely on the
loose analogy between some aspects of coherentism and cumu-
lative case legal arguments. Thus, as a matter of coherentist
theory, no single element of our experience, itself, may rise to
50. See Lehrer, supra note 49, at 5; Bonjour, supra note 47, at 281; Williams,
supra note 47, at 245; Kress, supra note 47, at 1381.
51. See, e.g., Michael R. DePaul, Two Conceptions of Coherence Methods in
Ethics, 96 MIND 463, 463 (1987); Norman Daniels, Wide Reflective Equilibrium
and Theory Acceptance in Ethics, 80 J. PHIL. 256 (1979).
52. See, e.g., Kress, supra note 47, at 1384, 1404 (discussing in particular the
legal and adjudicational coherentism of Professor Ronald Dworkin).
53. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 47, at 343; Bonjour, supra note 47, at 281.
54. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 47, at 244.
55. Coherentism seeks to avoid both vicious, unproductive circularity of argu-
ment, and merely formal consistency among the various elements of the argument,
in which the degree of mutual supportiveness among those elements is near zero.
See, e.g., Bonjour, supra note 47, at 288 ("A coherent system must be consistent,
but a consistent system need not be very coherent .... [Cloherence will obviously
be a matter of degree.").
56. Kress, supra note 47, at 1381.
57. See Williams, supra note 47, at 247-48.
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the level of establishing knowledge. But some sort of mutually
supportive set of experiences and other considerations may,
nonetheless, suffice to produce genuine knowledge.58 By anal-
ogy, a cumulative case legal argument might rise to any level of
strength and meet any legal standard of proof, despite the in-
sufficiency in isolation of each of the individual component
arguments .59
III. THE VARIED INTERESTS UNDERLYING
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN HIGHER EDUCATION:
OUTLINING A CUMULATIVE CASE ARGUMENT
A. The Interests at Stake
One way to show the distortion of the commonly conducted
judicial hunt for some single, compelling interest is to consider
the broad range of interests served by current forms of affirma-
tive action admission programs in public and private higher
education.
We can begin a survey of a number of such interests by rec-
ognizing that some can be classified, in some rough sense, as
more "forward-looking"60 and others as more "backward-look-
ing."61 A "forward-looking" justification might take the present
circumstances as a baseline and apply principles of distributive
justice, equality, or utilitarianism to produce a morally superior
58. See, e.g., Bonjour, supra note 47.
59. A possible disanalogy is that coherentism aspires to more than mere logi-
cal consistency among arguments that are somehow mutually supportive. See
Bonjour, supra note 47, at 288. In contrast, there seems to be no reason why the
various elements of a cumulative case argument could not be merely mutually con-
sistent, if not even in some mutual tension. Of course, we could say that the ele-
ments of a cumulative case argument necessarily support one another in the sense
that they jointly cooperate or coordinate to establish some particular conclusion
that none of the arguments could establish separately. And it seems fair to go
further. The more clearly incomplete or somehow deficient any of the "leaky
bucket" individual components is, the more likely it will be that other components,
perhaps equally "leaky," but in different places, will have to be carefully fitted,
dovetailed, and coordinated with those components. We cannot remedy the prob-
lem of one leaky bucket by placing it at random within another, differently leaky
bucket. Instead, we must coordinate the buckets so as to effectively stop the leak.
For discussion of the "leaky bucket" objection to cumulative case arguments, see
Thomas, supra note 11, at 41; MITCHELL, supra note 18, at 39-40.
60. See, e.g., Albert G. Mosley, in ALBERT G. MOSLEY & NICHOLAS CAPALDI,
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: SOCIAL JUSTICE OR UNFAIR PREFERENCE? 44 (1996).
61. See, e.g., id. at 24.
[Vol. 23:1
2002] CUMULATIVE CASE LEGAL ARGUMENTS 13
future.62 A more "backward-looking" justification might focus
on past injustices and the resulting present unjust enrichment;
and then apply principles of corrective or retributive justice to
roughly restore a moral equilibrium.63 However, completely
disentangling these two general approaches may be more diffi-
cult than it seems. 64
"Forward-looking," as opposed to "backward-looking" justi-
fications constitute only one axis of affirmative action interests.
Both public and private schools may see an affirmative action
program as contributing to the school's "external"65 goals, its
"internal"66 goals, or a mixture of the two. 67 Although other
axes of affirmative action interests might be cited, we may al-
ready suppose that academic affirmative action can promote
many interests and be supported by many arguments.
Probably, the family of arguments on which the greatest le-
gal hopes are currently pinned is a set of arguments classified
under the rubric of diversity. While we might say that there is
a diversity argument for affirmative action, it is more accurate
to say that there is a range of diversity-based arguments for
affirmative action. Some forms of diversity arguments, admit-
tedly, are closely related and difficult to separate. Potentially,
some forms of diversity arguments may come into conflict with
62. See id. at 44.
63. See id. at 24.
64. See George Sher, Diversity, 28 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 85, 85 (1999) ("[I]n every
version, the [forward-looking] appeal to diversity raises difficult questions whose
most plausible answers turn on tacit [backward-looking] appeals to past wrongdo-
ing."); Sanford Levinson, Diversity, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 573, 602 (2000) (citing
Professor Jack Balkin for the view that diversity is really primarily about distribu-
tive justice in the allocation of human capital).
65. See Anthony T. Kronman, Is Diversity a Value in American Higher Educa-
tion?, 52 FLA. L. REv. 861, 867 (2000) (redistribution of educational opportunities
for the sake of racial justice on a national scale).
66. See id. (focusing not on broad-scale racial justice, but on creating optimal
conditions for learning).
67. See id. (societal racial justice and genuine equality of opportunity as pre-
requisites to any assurance that a school's admissions criteria are not in practice
skewed or biased).
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other forms. 68 Yet, other diversity arguments may supplement,
reinforce, or complement one another. 69
Precisely who benefits from the presence of academic diver-
sity depends on just what sort of diversity argument is being
made. Beneficiaries of diversity might vary from the individual
admittees, to fellow group members on campus; to fellow group
members more generally; to the school as an ongoing institu-
tion; to future clients; or to the broader society. Thus, different
diversity arguments may emphasize different beneficiaries.
As few as one member of any minority group in an entire
entering class of a public or private school may impart some
minimal diversity value. That single person's mere member-
ship in the entering class may, by itself, have some modest edu-
cational value, at least for some non-minority students.
Furthermore, a minority student's mere physical presence in a
particular classroom may affect the way a class is taught. But
even this limited further effect requires at least one minority
student in each particular classroom.
68. Suppose, unrealistically, that an admissions committee, seeking to fill the
last admissions slot, were faced with a choice between a minority applicant and a
white applicant. The minority applicant, miraculously, is known to hold precisely
the median, already well-known viewpoint among that particular minority group
on all issues. The white applicant has recently been unfrozen, and is equally mi-
raculously known to have first hand knowledge of the views of a number of Consti-
tutional framers, and to largely share those views. At least in this rather artificial
case, a conflict may arise between enhancing racial or ethnic diversity and enhanc-
ing viewpoint or perspectival diversity. For background, see Grutter v. Bollinger,
137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 849 (E.D. Mich. 2001), injunction stayed, 247 F.3d 631 (6th
Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 617 (2002). See also the argument discussed in
Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811, 824 (E.D. Mich. 2000); Wessmann v. Git-
tens, 160 F.3d 790, 798 (1st Cir. 1998) (public high school context).
69. Typically enough, enhancing racial or ethnic diversity by admitting, say, a
Mexican-American, Haitian-American, or Puerto Rican-American may also expand
the range of observations and viewpoints expressed in class on a variety of issues.
When racial or ethnic diversity contributes to what we might call perspectival or
viewpoint diversity, as will be typical, we may refer to the circumstance of "peda-
gogical diversity." This term is borrowed from Rachael F. Moran, Diversity, Dis-
tance, and the Delivery of Higher Education, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 775, 776 (1998).
There may also be differences in the diversity arguments made regarding public
schools and some or all private schools. In general, we shall set aside the complex
uncertainties associated with possible differences in the constitutional standards
applicable to public schools and the civil rights statutory standards applicable to
private schools. For concise discussion, see Samuel Issacharoff, Can Affirmative
Action Be Defended?, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 669, 673 n.ll (1998).
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Going beyond these limited effects, we might then consider
more active sorts of student classroom contributions. The sub-
stance of a minority student's contributions to class discussions
may often depend upon whether he or she is the sole minority
student in the class, or one of a meaningful number. A single
minority person in a class may feel a burden of group represen-
tation; therefore, she may shade her own contributions toward
the expected, or toward the most commonly expressed, perspec-
tives among that particular minority group. As the number of
members of any given minority group rises in any particular
classroom, we may expect more diversity of viewpoint and per-
spective from each minority student. This result is due to both
increased numbers and the diffusion of responsibility to act as
the group's spokesperson. 70 In this respect, ethnic diversity and
viewpoint diversity reinforce one another.
This dynamic may be worked through for each relevant mi-
nority group7 l and for each particular law school class or other
academic course. Just as it is false to imagine that members of
a minority group think alike on any real issue, it is false to im-
agine that minority voices contribute distinctively only to par-
ticular law school classes and not to others. It is mistaken to
imagine that minority group students will bring fresh perspec-
tives to a course in civil rights, immigration, or constitutional
70. For background see Brief for Appellants at 10-11, Grutter v. Bollinger, 288
F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2001) (No. 01-1447), available at www.umich.edu/-urel/admis-
sions/legal/grutter/grutterappeal.html (last visited November 1, 2002).
71. See, e.g., Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 798 (The relevant school policy "takes
into account only five groups-blacks, whites, Hispanics, Asians, and Native Ameri-
cans-without recognizing that none is monolithic."). It is of course a truism that
any distinctive ethnic group will exhibit internal diversity in various respects, in
addition to some generally shared historical experiences. Diversity arguments for
affirmative action may in turn emphasize either the intra-group similarities or
dissimilarities. Deciding which racial, ethnic or other sorts of groups may also
contribute distinctively to the various benefits of diversity is, of course, a difficult
problem, based in social science, public policy, and community history and senti-
ment. In practice, to include minorities who have played only a quite limited role
in local community history invites the criticism that the affirmative action pro-
gram is unduly broad and ahistorical. But excluding such groups invites the
charges of arbitrariness and underinclusiveness. See id. As it will always be pos-
sible to judicially second-guess the inclusion or exclusion of one or more groups as
affirmative action beneficiaries, it is, realistically, open to any court to find lack of
narrow tailoring in any affirmative action program if the court is so inclined. See
R. George Wright, The Fourteen Faces of Narrowness: How Courts Legitimize What
They Do, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 167, 194-99 (1997).
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law but not to a course in consumer protection, income tax, in-
surance, or banking.
This would rightly suggest the value of a critical mass of
relevant minority group students, not only for explicitly ra-
cially-related courses, but for any particular subject-matter
class of substantial size. However, the value of diversity cannot
be exhausted at even this level. For example, a law school
would lose much of the potential value of racial and ethnic di-
versity if it pursued racial and ethic diversity, but all other uni-
versity departments and schools did not. It is helpful to think
both of the ways in which group members may reach common
conclusions based on common group experiences, and of the
ways in which many members of any group importantly differ
among themselves. The value of diversity is not exhausted by
the ways in which minority perspectives may differ from those
of others. Part of the value of racial and ethnic diversity con-
sists of bringing home to all students the range of commonly-
held student beliefs that run across racial and ethnic lines.
There is certainly value in the discovery or the reassurance of
some degree of commonality. All of these considerations sug-
gest both different values of, and different arguments for, racial
and ethnic diversity.
While racial and ethnic diversity do not exhaust the forms
of diversity with educational value, 72 racial and ethnic diversity
may certainly constitute an important element of an overall
broader pattern of diversity. 73 Even those academic institutions
72. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978)
(opinion of Powell, J.); Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 106 F. Supp.
2d 1362, 1368 (S.D. Ga. 2000), affd, 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001). See also
Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738, 752 (2d Cir. 2000) ("'True
diversity' . . . may certainly be defined more broadly than race.").
73. See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-14. For critical discussion, see Hopwood
v. State, 78 F.3d 932, 942-50 (5th Cir. 1996) (rejecting an ethnic or racial diversity
justification for the University of Texas' Law School admissions affirmative action
program). For an alternative perspective, see Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d
811, 816-31 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (discussing, among other cases, Hopwood v. State, 78
F.3d at 932, in the context of a university's affirmative action diversity rationale).
In a different context, see UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of University of
Wisconsin System, 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1176 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (campus hate speech
overbreadth case) (citing Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke for the constitutional
permissibility of campus diversity along racial or ethnic dimensions, but striking
down the speech restriction at issue as limiting intellectual diversity or "the diver-
sity of ideas among students"). For further critical discussion of the Hopwood
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that choose to legally justify their affirmative action programs
solely by means of the value of diversity recognize that racial
and ethnic diversity are merely components of a broader, more
general diversity policy. 74
We do not question the purely tactical soundness in litiga-
tion of waiving all possible justifications for an affirmative ac-
tion program apart from diversity. Such decisions must reflect
realism regarding the courts and the case law as much as any
broader logic of persuasion. As a matter of merely predicting
what a particular court will do, exclusive reliance on a diversity
argument as opposed to a broader-based or an explicitly cumu-
lative case argument may be sound.75
Tactics aside, it is important to understand how a unitary,"all eggs in one basket" legal argument for academic affirmative
action fits in among the available alternative approaches. We
court's rejection of the opinion of Justice Powell in Bakke, see Smith v. University
of Washington, Law School, 233 F.3d 1188, 1197-1201, 1200 n.9 (9th Cir. 2000)
(educational diversity, of which racial or ethnic diversity may be an element, as a
compelling governmental interest for equal protection purposes unless and until
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke is authoritatively repudiated).
74. See Brief for Appellants, at 3, 5; Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th
Cir. 2001) (No. 01-1447), available at http://www.umich.edu/urel/admissions/legal/
grutter/grutter-appeal.html) (last visited Nov. 1, 2002). The opinion of the district
court in Grutter is Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001),
injunction stayed, 247 F.3d 631 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 617 (2002).
75. Cf Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL
PAPERS 167, 173 (1920) (reprinting O.W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10
HARv. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897)) ("The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact
... are what I mean by the law."). As to the soundness of placing all the affirma-
tive action eggs in the single basket of diversity, Hopwood v. State, 78 F.3d 932
(5th Cir. 1996), serves as a warning: "[Alny consideration of race or ethnicity by
the law school for the purpose of achieving a diverse student body is not a compel-
ling interest .... ." Id. at 944. See also Builders Ass'n of Greater Chicago v.
County, 256 F.3d 642, 644 (7th Cir. 2001) ("Whether nonremedial justifications for
'reverse discrimination' by a public body are ever possible is unsettled."); Grutter v.
Bollinger, 247 F.3d 631, 633 (6th Cir. 2001); Brewer, 212 F.3d at 747 ("[W]hat in-
terests government may legitimately invoke to justify race-based classifications is
largely unsettled.") (quoting Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 795); Hill v. Ross, 183 F.3d
1219, 1222 (7th Cir. 1998). For a sampling of some law review commentary on the
uncertain status of diversity-based justifications for affirmative action, see, e.g.,
Leslie Yalof Garfield, Hopwood v. Texas: Strict in Theory or Fatal In Fact?, 34 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 497 (1997); Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A
Comprehensive Approach to Strict Scrutiny After Adarand and Shaw, 149 U. PA.
L. REV. 1 (2000); Susan M. Maxwell, Racial Classifications Under Strict Scrutiny:
Policy Considerations and the Remedial-Plus Approach, 77 TEX. L. REV. 259
(1998).
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cannot understand or intelligently reform our legal system until
we grasp the full range of alternative legal arguments, some of
which may be generally superior to an approach that promises a
tactical advantage on a single occasion. An appellate brief, ad-
mittedly, is generally not the best venue in which to explain and
argue for basic changes in the logic of constitutional analysis.
But such basic changes may still be ultimately appropriate.
For the sake of discussion, we will assume that in academic
affirmative action cases, diversity constitutes a single valuable
government interest, and that there is only a single diversity
argument for affirmative action. We will make this oversimpli-
fication merely for the sake of clarifying the nature of a cumula-
tive case argument for academic affirmative action.
However, if we unrealistically assume a single unified in-
terest in diversity, we must pay the price of artificial and dis-
torted analysis of affirmative action. The values underlying
academic affirmative action are too complex to be captured by
any unitary idea of diversity. The idea of diversity inevitably
displays its own multi-faceted nature and points beyond itself to
other values, interests, and other justifications for academic af-
firmative action. 76
Of course, not all of the alternative, non-diversity-based ar-
guments in favor of academic affirmative action are uncon-
troversial or individually compelling; perhaps none of these
arguments is uncontroversial or individually compelling, but
that is precisely the important point. The hunt for some single,
compelling (and narrowly tailored) interest underlying affirma-
tive action distorts legal and moral reality. There may well be
no such single argument. However, this does not show that a
sufficiently compelling cumulative case, comprising separately
weaker component arguments, cannot be made to support af-
firmative action.
We can continue to outline a cumulative case argument for
academic affirmative action by listing and briefly documenting
some of the other public interests and values, beyond diversity,
underlying typical academic affirmative action plans. Again, no
single such interest may, by itself, seem sufficient to justify af-
76. See Sher, supra note 64, at 85 and accompanying text; Levinson, supra
note 64, at 602 and accompanying text.
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firmative action. But the logic of argument, even regarding mo-
mentous constitutional decisions, actually requires no such
thing.
Let us at this point consider some of the more "backward-
looking" justifications for academic affirmative action, and then
move generally "forward" as we further survey the arguments
beyond diversity. Certainly, one important theme of some aca-
demic affirmative action cases is the constitutional value of
remedying identifiable past or present discrimination by some
unit of government, if not more generally, by the local or na-
tional society. The central focus of legal discussions of this
counter-discriminatory value has been Justice Powell's crucial
opinion in the Bakke case. 77 Justice Powell concluded in the
medical school admissions context that the state had "a legiti-
mate and substantial interest in ameliorating, or eliminating
where feasible, the disabling effects of identified discrimina-
tion[,]"78 at least on the basis of adequate findings by competent
bodies. 79 Today, Justice Powell's language of "legitimate and
substantial"80 interest would likely require elevation to the level
of genuinely compelling interests, at least in the case of race
and ethnicity.8 '
The current case law does not rule out the possibility of aca-
demic affirmative action justified, in an appropriate case, solely
on remedial or counter-discriminatory grounds.8 2 One compli-
77. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265, 307 (opinion of Powell, J.).
78. Id. at 307. For extended discussion from a more philosophical perspective
of some of the issues attending compensation-based arguments for affirmative ac-
tion, see, e.g., ALAN H. GOLDMAN, JUSTICE AND REVERSE DISCRIMINATION, 65-140
(1979).
79. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 309 (opinion of Powell, J.).
80. Id. at 307.
81. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 222 (1995); Billish
v. City of Chicago, 989 F.2d 890, 893 (7th Cir. 1993) (en banc). See also Chicago
Firefighters Local 2 v. City of Chicago, 249 F.3d 649, 657 (7th Cir. 2001) (affirma-
tive action requires "not only that there be a compelling case for it but also that it
discriminate as little as is consistent with the achievement of its valid objective.").
Anomalously or not, the standard for gender-based affirmative action seems to be
mid-level scrutiny. See, e.g., Danskine v. Miami Dade Fire Dep't, 253 F.3d 1288,
1293 (11th Cir. 2001).
82. See, e.g., Smith v. Univ. of Wash., Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1197 (dicta);
Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811, 816, n.5 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (dicta). More
broadly, see, e.g., Majeske v. City of Chicago, 218 F.3d 816, 820 (7th Cir. 2000) ("It
is well-settled law in this Circuit that a governmental agency has a compelling
interest in remedying its previous discrimination[,] and the agency may use racial
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cation is that some courts interpret the narrow tailoring re-
quired in such a case with particular rigor.8 3 But from the
uncertain state of the Supreme Court cases and other prece-
dents, it is unclear how relatively broad affirmative action pro-
grams can be universally justified on purely remedial grounds,
especially where a school in question may have been practicing
affirmative action conscientiously for more than a generation.
By itself, a remedial approach to academic affirmative action
may turn out to be less than universal in its range of justifica-
tory power.
This is not to minimize the remedial argument for affirma-
tive action in academia, in which the need for such remedial
action can be established to the satisfaction of the courts. But
such a remedial argument must meet compelling interest and
narrow tailoring requirements. If a reviewing court is so in-
clined, it is not difficult to find any remedially-justified aca-
demic affirmative action program constitutionally defective, at
least on grounds of alleged lack of narrow tailoring.
One problem is that the long established existence of a
meaningful affirmative action program at a school can lead
some courts to minimize the amount of any remaining,
redressable, past discrimination by that school. A school may
be perceived as less serious about truly making up for past dis-
crimination the more it limits its affirmative action program.
On the other hand, more ambitious affirmative action programs
may be said to not only redress past wrongs, but also to unduly
trample the opportunities of some non-minority students.
Thus, such programs remedy past discrimination but lack nar-
row tailoring. 4
Similarly, any court can find an unconstitutional lack of
narrow tailoring or proportionality between any specific, nu-
preferencing to rectify that past conduct.") (citing McNamara v. City of Chicago,
138 F.3d 1219, 1221 (7th Cir. 1998)).
83. See, e.g., Hopwood v. State, 78 F.3d 932, 951-55, n.44 (5th Cir. 1996). But
cf. Hopwood v. Texas, 84 F.3d 720, 724-25 (5th Cir. 1996) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Judge Stewart traced the adjudicated history of racial discrimination practiced by
the University of Texas Law School, beginning with the well-known law school
admissions case of Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), and the post-admission
treatment of Sweatt, through continuing discrimination in the 1950's and 1960's,
the desegregation plan of 1983, and beyond.
84. For discussion, see Wright, supra note 71, at 197-98.
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merical, affirmative action remedy provided for any group and
the degree of suffering or exclusion that group has historically
faced locally. A court may find that group A suffered worse
than group B in the local area but is not being provided reme-
dial affirmative action to a proportionate degree. This arguable
lack of proportionality can always be claimed, if only, because
specific affirmative action programs cannot be based on univer-
sally shared historical judgments, and because no affirmative
action program considers only degrees of past discrimination to
the exclusion of all other relevant factors. Lack of narrow tai-
loring may also be found if a reviewing court disagrees with the
school's inclusion or exclusion of particular benefitted groups.
Perversely, a school's failure to specify a particular numeri-
cal minority admissions goal may also count as lack of narrow
tailoring. Any specific number may, again, be viewed as arbi-
trary, rigid, or as a quasi-quota, but the absence of a specified
number suggests the fatal vices of subjectivity, standardless
discretion, open-endedness, and indefiniteness.8 5 The more a
group has been historically injured, the greater the remedy that
may seem appropriate. However, as the remedy expands for
those most adversely affected by discrimination, so does the
likely disparity in standard "paper-and-pencil" credentials be-
tween the most victimized groups and other groups. A court so
inclined can find that such a disparity in paper credentials
amounts to an excessive burden on persons who are not mem-
bers of the most severely victimized group.8 6 Thus, both quanti-
fication and lack of quantification in remedial affirmative action
admissions programs can be seen as insufficiently narrowly tai-
lored, arbitrary, and excessively burdensome.
Remedial academic affirmative action, itself, leaves great
discretion in the hands of the courts. The judicially-imposed re-
quirement that the need for remedial affirmative action still be
compelling and the program be narrowly tailored practically in-
vites arbitrary rejection by unsympathetic courts or confine-
ment of the remedy to relatively narrow circumstances.
85. For discussion, see Taxman v. Bd. of Ed. of Township of Piscataway, 91
F.3d 1547, 1575 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting). Cf Johnson v.
Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 106 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1372-73 (S.D. Ga. 2000)
(lack of numerical goal), affd, 236 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001).
86. See, e.g., Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 955 n.50.
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This is not to deny the moral logic of remedially-driven af-
firmative action.87 But it is doubtful whether purely remedial
arguments will by themselves generally be found both compel-
ling and narrowly tailored for the selective academic institu-
tions where affirmative action is commonly practiced. Even as
a tactical matter, it makes more sense to include remedial inter-
ests along with diversity arguments and other concerns in a cu-
mulative-case argument for the constitutionality of affirmative
action. In this supplementary, contributory role, remedial ar-
guments need not be uniformly compelling or by themselves
narrowly tailored to some overall goal. Yet, they may still, in a
cumulative case argument, contribute to a sufficient overall ar-
gument for academic affirmative action programs.
Academics and other professionals have raised a related ar-
gument for affirmative action as a form of compensation for
broader past or present societal injustices.88 Such a broader
compensatory approach need not be as narrow and constrained
as the remedial argument mentioned above. However, such
broader societal compensatory approaches may raise controver-
sial issues of their own.89 Again, one advantage of a well-con-
structed cumulative case argument is that no single component
of the cumulative case argument need be by itself decisive, con-
vincing, universally relevant, overwhelmingly popular, or nar-
rowly tailored. 90
87. Redressing past and even present academic discrimination, along with
reassessing what should count as genuine merit, remain as unfinished business.
See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence, III, Two Views of the River: A Critique of the Liberal
Defense of Affirmative Action, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 928, 931 (2001).
88. For an endorsement of such a compensatory approach as one element
among other approaches, see, e.g., GERTRUDE EzoRSKy, RACISM AND JUSTICE: THE
CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 93 (1991) (referring to "compensation to blacks for
past wrongs against them"); S. Kershnar, Strong Affirmative Action Programs and
Disproportionate Burdens, 33 J. VALUE INQUIRY 201, 201 (1999) (referring to "com-
pensatory justice," among other justifications, as "[almong the most widely cited
moral justifications for strong affirmative action").
89. See, e.g., John Kekes, The Injustice of Affirmative Action Involving Prefer-
ential Treatment, in THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DEBATE 193, 197 (Steven M. Cahn
ed. 1995) (discussing, but ultimately largely rejecting as inadequate, broad com-
pensatory justice-based arguments for broad affirmative action programs).
90. While there has been discussion of the sufferings of and discrimination
practiced against non-minorities, the recent arrival of many affected persons,
problems of victim identification and racial group identification, and the arguable
subjective innocence of many of those adversely affected by compensation-based
affirmative action, see generally id., there are of course familiar responses to each
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Arguments in favor of academic affirmative action are also
sometimes formulated in terms of corrective justice, 91 of some-
how restoring a competitive economic balance that presumably
would have existed but for discrimination, 92 or in terms of dis-
tributive justice93 or simply racial justice, 94 which may have
"forward-looking" as well as "backward-looking" dimensions.
These arguments may, to a degree, overlap with and renew the
remedial95 and compensatory 96 arguments noted above. But the
of these concerns. See, e.g., Albert G. Mosley's contribution in ALBERT G. MOSLEY
& NICHOLAS CAPALDI, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: SOCIAL JUSTICE OR UNFAIR PREFER-
ENCE? 1-63 (1996). For supplementary argumentation based on what appears to be
the largest and most useful database of university experience with affirmative ac-
tion, thereby permitting some progress beyond speculation and anecdote, see WIL-
LIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BoK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS
(1998). For responses to the work of Bowen & Bok from several distinct points on
the political spectrum, see Lawrence, supra note 87, at 935-40; Ronald Dworkin, Is
Affirmative Action Doomed?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 5, 1998, 56-60; Terrance
Sandalow, Review of The Shape of the River, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1874 (1999); Ste-
phen Thernstrom & Abigail Thernstrom, Reflections on the Shape of the River, 46
UCLA L. REV. 1583 (1999). As for the advantages of cumulative case arguments in
addressing appropriate narrow tailoring issues, see infra Section IV.
91. See, e.g., Moran, supra note 69, at 776 (discussing "a corrective justice ra-
tionale" for academic affirmative action).
92. See Robert Amdur, Compensatory Justice: The Question of Costs, in THE
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DEBATE 91, 93 (Stephen M. Cahn ed. 1995) (focusing not so
much on provable guilt or malicious intentions, but on unjust enrichment or un-
fairly accrued advantages, resulting in skewed opportunity structures).
93. See, e.g., MOSLEY & CAPALDI, supra note 90, at 44 (characterizing a distrib-
utive justice rationale for affirmative action as "forward-looking"); Richard Del-
gado, Why Universities are Morally Obligated to Strive for Diversity: Restoring the
Remedial Rationale for Affirmative Action, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 1165, 1165-67
(1997). Professor Delgado recognizes the distributive justice case for affirmative
action. Id. at 1165. But Professor Delgado sees the national commitment to both
the Bakke case and to distributive justice in general as in some jeopardy. Id. He
therefore seeks to develop a "complementary" backward-looking approach focusing
on "retributive or remedial" justice. Id. at 1166. As we have suggested, the back-
ward-looking justifications for affirmative action have their own limitations as
well. See sources cited supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text. Furthermore,
Professor Delgado cites additional concerns. See Delgado, supra at 1166. There-
fore, we would emphasize the use of "complementary" retributive or remedial jus-
tice arguments not as a "fall-back" or "second-best" argument, but along with all
other sorts of arguments with which it can coherently and constructively be
teamed, as one limited element of a broader cumulative-case argument, in which
the overall argument may be stronger than the sum of its parts.
94. Professor Gertrude Ezorsky has referred generally, and usefully, to "racial
justice" in one's workplace. EzoRsKY, supra note 88 and accompanying text.
95. See sources cited supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
96. See sources cited supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
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idea of distributive justice certainly need not be essentially
backward-looking. A rule of genuinely fair and equal opportu-
nity in the present must be informed by history and by an un-
derstanding of past injustice, but its primary focus may be on
present day comparisons and on future patterns of
accomplishment.
Distributive justice arguments in particular are, thus, often
distinguishable, at least in emphasis from more "backward-
looking" retributive or corrective justice arguments. The crucial
point, though, is to see these arguments not as competing ap-
proaches, or one as weaker than the other, but as mutually com-
patible, and perhaps, mutually reinforcing components of a
cumulative case argument. The overall argument may, in some
cases, be stronger and more persuasive than any single element
of the argument. This synergism may arise in part because only
the overall affirmative action argument can tell a coherent, con-
sistent, and powerful story about history, current practice, and
the future. An argument coherently accomodating past, pre-
sent, and future synergism may be stronger than the sum of its
parts, and perhaps much stronger than any one of its parts.
Let us continue, though, with our survey of some of the ar-
guments for academic affirmative action. The remainder of the
affirmative action arguments mentioned below refer to particu-
lar elements of the present or the future and to present and fu-
ture consequences of affirmative action policies. Broadly
utilitarian considerations, as well as matters of right and jus-
tice narrowly conceived,9 7 are emphasized here.
There are a number of possible utilitarian arguments in
favor of academic affirmative action.98 For example, if we as-
sume that minority beneficiaries of affirmative action typically
have less income than the persons they effectively dislodge from
the particular academic admission slot in question, the princi-
ple of the declining marginal utility of money may argue for af-
97. For a strong distinction between arguments of social utility and argu-
ments ofjustice, see Thomas Nagel, Equal Treatment and Compensatory Discrimi-
nation, 2 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 348, 361 (1973).
98. See MOSLEY & CAPALDI, supra note 90, at 44 (referring to "maximizing
social utility"); Kershnar, supra note 88, at 201 (referring to consequentialistjusti-
fications more generally).
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firmative action, 99 all else equal. 100 As well, if academic
affirmative action programs signal a broadening in the range of
realistic alternative career paths open to minorities and such
programs credibly convey socially valuable information to mi-
norities, they may promote optimal career choices.' 0 ' This pro-
vision of valuable information may lead to enhanced social
welfare.
Further, there is a utilitarian component, in addition to a
focus on individual desert, 0 2 in an affirmative action program
that exposes and partially remedies the arbitrary biases, undue
narrowness, and social unresponsiveness of current "paper-and-
pencil" criteria for law school and other selective academic ad-
missions.10 3 There is nothing unrealistic in imagining that the
admissions criteria commonly used in affirmative action pro-
grams may lead to genuinely better and more socially valuable
lawyering, in many instances, than the narrower reliance on
some function of grade point averages, LSAT scores, and other
traditional considerations. 0 4 Merit is often casually assumed to
be reflected by grades and test scores, but this focus is certainly
not a neutral, objective measure of merit.
There are, after all, a wide variety of legal jobs in which
there is much more to relevant sorts of merit than the "paper-
and-pencil" versions of merit that traditional admissions crite-
ria purport, however ineffectively, to measure. Not all legal
work is heavily-lawyered, abstract, lengthy document-drafting
work for large corporations by large law firms. Some effective
lawyering instead requires knowledge of local customs, foreign
99. See Sterling Harwood, Affirmative Action is Justified: A Reply to Newton,
1990 CONTEMPORARY PHIL. 14, 14-17 (1990).
100. For an exposition of the principle of the declining marginal utility of
money, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 500-04 (5th ed. 1998).
For applications of the theory in non-affirmative action contexts, see, e.g., Richard
L. Hasen, Vote Buying, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1329 (2000); Lawrence Zelenak, The
Puzzling Case of the Revenue-Maximizing Lottery, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1, 38 (2000).
101. See, e.g., Sarah Stroud, The Aim of Affirmative Action, 25 SOCIAL THEORY
& PRAc. 385, 386 (1999); Harwood, supra note 99, at 14-17.
102. See Kershnar, supra note 88, at 201.
103. See, e.g., Harwood, supra note 99, at 14-17.
104. See EzoRsKY, supra note 88, at 88; Richard H. Fallon, To Each According
to His Ability, From None According to His Race: The Concept of Merit in the Law
of Antidiscrimination, 60 B.U. L. REV. 815, 818-19 (1980) (discussing leadership,
judgment, and character).
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language and idioms, local culture, local actors and institutions,
skill with people, the ability to inspire trust, insightfulness into
circumstance, realism, personal judgment, and shrewdness. It
is difficult to imagine that such qualities are better measured
by GPA or LSAT score than by other criteria. "Paper-and-pen-
cil" merit is often rather a far cry from other equally reasonable
views of merit.
To some, the traditional emphasis on "paper-and-pencil"
merit seems natural and self-evidently justified. The idea that
non-minorities have a natural right to be judged on GPA, LSAT
scores, and other traditional criteria, even where detrimental
reliance on these indicators can no longer be reasonable, dies
hard.10 5 Arbitrarily taken for granted is that the society overall
benefits from heavy reliance on GPA and LSAT score, as op-
posed to other indicators of various legal skills.
But these claims are quite contestable at the level of social
welfare, particularly when we consider the likely welfare gains
to minority clients. This is so even if, for simplicity, we here set
aside the idea that merit selection itself requires opportunities
to acquire the necessary background education to compete for
admission. 106 Especially for legally underserved minority com-
munities, facility with synonyms and antonyms may be less cru-
cial than a genuine understanding of local circumstances. 10 7
105. For discussion, see Norman Daniels, Merit and Meritocracy, 7 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 206, 215-16 (1978).
106. See Christopher McCrudden, Merit Principles, 18 Ox. J. LEGAL STUD.
543, 553 (1998).
107. For a selection, see Fallon, supra note 104, at 818-19; Richard Delgado,
1998 Hugo Black Lecture: Ten Arguments Against Affirmative Action-How
Valid?, 50 ALA. L. REV. 135, 144-45 (1998) (noting both the contingency and rea-
sonable alterability of conceptions of merit, and the correspondence between the
criteria imposed upon applicants and the typical strengths and interests of law
professors themselves); Harwood, supra note 99, at 14-17; Herma Hill Kay, The
Challenge to Diversity in Legal Education, 34 IND. L. REV. 55, 64-65 (2000) (dis-
cussing the broadening of Boalt Hall admissions criteria); Daria Roithmayr,
Deconstructing the Distinction Between Bias and Merit, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1449
(1997); Rennard Strickland, Rethinking Fairness, Diversity, and Appropriate Test
Use in Law School Admission Models: Observations of an Itinerant Dean, 31 U.
TOL. L. REV. 743, 746 (2000) ("[A] law school's thorough soul-searching will result
in a lengthy list of qualities that are desirable in students .... "); Susan Sturm &
Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal,
84 CAL. L. REV. 953, 957 (1996) ("[Clertain paper-and-pencil tests have been used
as 'wealth preferences' or poll taxes .... ). See also Rachel Moran, Diversity and Its
Discontents: The End of Affirmative Action at Boalt Hall, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2241,
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Academic affirmative action is, even in its forward-looking
dimensions, not entirely a matter of welfare maximization. Af-
firmative action, in its more forward-looking dimensions, is also
a matter of the sheer values of equality, 08 non-subordination, 10 9
and the minimization of inherited group privilege." 0 In addi-
tion, the idea of genuine, healthy overall social integration is
related to, but not the same as, that of equality. Two groups
might be roughly equal in power and opportunity yet isolated
from or distrustful and ignorant of one another."' Thus, equal-
ity is not identical with genuine social integration or social soli-
darity. There are important affirmative action arguments
aimed at promoting occupational" 2 and broader societal" 3 inte-
gration and full participation 1 4 in American life, with genuine
acceptance and appreciation of historical minorities." 5
The alternative to these anti-subordination and integra-
tionist values is said to involve the resegregation of higher edu-
cation. 16 The relative absence of some racial and ethnic
2325-27 (2000) (cataloguing a mix of law student reactions to the question of the
value and use of the LSAT).
108. See Richard Wasserstrom, Preferential Treatment, Color-Blindness, and
the Evils of Racism and Racial Discrimination, in THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DE-
BATE 153, 155 (Steven M. Cahn ed., 1995) (discussing the harms and unfairness of
systemic racial inequality, and various kinds of inequalities based on race, disad-
vantage, dominance, and subordination).
109. See id. at 155; Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 864 (E.D. Mich.
2001) (quoting Professor Frank Wu to the effect that "[flor many people of color,
racism has decreased the amount and value of economic, social, and cultural capi-
tal inherited from our ancestors. Not only did we receive less material wealth, we
also received less 'insider knowledge' and fewer social contacts so instrumental to
one's educational and professional advancement in America"). See also Giradeau
A. Spann, Writing Off Race, 63 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 467, 468 (2000) (promoting
racial equality). Professor Spann favors leaving affirmative action issues to the
political branches, on the theory that the Constitution says nothing about affirma-
tive action. See id.
110. See, e.g., MOSLEY & CAPALDI, supra note 90, at 44; Wasserstrom, supra
note 108, at 155.
111. See, e.g., Wasserstrom, supra note 108, at 155; Lawrence, supra note 87,
at 931.
112. See, e.g., EzoRsKl, supra note 88, at 93.
113. See, e.g., David Cole, Rainbow School Colors, 272 NATION 23, 23 (April
16, 2001).
114. See Sandalow, supra note 90, at 1912.
115. See id.
116. See Brief for Appellants at 10-11, Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th
Cir. 2001) (No. 01-1447).
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minorities on campus 1 7 would presumably lead to a similar rel-
ative absence from key positions in business and the profes-
sions,"" reinforcing a racial and socioeconomic divide 19 whose
origins were partly in state action. 20 Among the consequences
of resegregation would presumably be a continuation of rather
limited minority confidence in most aspects of the legal
system. 121
It is thus easy to argue for the value of affirmative action
from the standpoint of various legally underserved minority
communities. It is certainly possible to argue that affirmative
action enhances either the actual availability of legal services to
those communities, 122 or the visibility and quality of legal ser-
vice delivery. 23 Over time affirmative action may lead to an
enhanced sense of the legitimacy of the broader legal system in
minority neighborhoods. 24
Suppose affirmative action did result in more, and better,
professional services in traditionally underserved and often
alienated communities. Could this argument itself be somehow
turned to the service of, say, a dominant social group whose own
preferences as consumers might be for service providers ethni-
cally like themselves? 25 Such a constituency might be happiest
with the absence of affirmative action.
Even if we imagine, however, a dominant group that pre-
fers all legal service providers-not just for themselves, but for
117. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305 (1978) (opin-
ion of Powell, J.).
118. See Dworkin, supra note 90, at 60 (referring to "the still-deplorable ab-
sence of blacks from key positions in government, politics, business, and the pro-
fessions"). See also Samuel Issacharoff, Can Affirmative Action Be Defended?, 59
OHIO ST. L.J. 669, 682 (1998).
119. See Issacharoff, supra note 118, at 682.
120. See id.
121. As well, the broader, more inclusive, responsive logic under which minor-
ity lawyers are recruited and selected might help "to build the confidence of minor-
ity persons in the legal system." Robert A. Sedler, The Constitution and Racial
Preference in Law School Admissions, 75 MICH. B.J. 1160, 1160 (1996).
122. See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 306 (opinion of Powell, J.).
123. See MOSLEY & CAPALDI, supra note 90, at 52 ("A number of studies have
shown that underrepresented minority physicians are more likely than their ma-
jority counterparts to care for poor patients and patients of similar ethnicity.").
See also Lawrence, supra note 87, at 937; Nagel, supra note 97, at 361; Wasser-
strom, supra note 108, at 156.
124. See, e.g., Sandalow, supra note 90, at 1991-12.
125. For generally relevant discussion, see Levinson, supra note 64, at 587-88.
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all ethnic groups as well-to be members of the dominant
group, we do not thereby logically put affirmative action at risk.
A dominant group's insistence on dominant group member ser-
vice for everyone is not legitimized by the preceding community
welfare and community preference arguments. The logic of af-
firmative action does not somehow also legitimize racial exclu-
siveness in academic admissions.
Affirmative action, after all, does not restrict access by
dominant group members to professionals of any ethnicity; it
only enhances freedom of consumer choice, for consumers of all
ethnic backgrounds. As well, there is more broadly a crucial
lack of symmetry between a dominant group and many histori-
cally subordinated minority groups. They are not, realistically,
mirror images of one another. The sensible preference of, let us
say, an immigrant with limited English language skills for an
attorney he or she can easily communicate with, and who may
more quickly grasp the practical realities of the client's circum-
stances, does not somehow legitimize the obviously dramatic
consequences of dominant group discrimination.
Let us consider a final argument that tends to support aca-
demic affirmative action. This argument focuses on the social
value of institutional academic freedom and autonomy, perhaps
under the general supervision of a board of trustees or an ac-
countable state legislative body. This argument itself has sev-
eral dimensions, but it is largely institutional and procedural.
The academic freedom argument focuses less on the merits of
an affirmative action policy, and more on who should make such
policy decisions and with what degree of judicial deference.
This academic freedom argument cannot be encompassed
within any of the arguments discussed above, as there is actu-
ally no guarantee that a university board of trustees, or a super-
vising legislative body, will always favor affirmative action.
But a distinct argument in favor of academic affirmative action
arises if, say, the university faculty and administration, the
board of trustees or, perhaps, the elected state legislature ap-
proves this decision.
Admissions decisions are, on this argument, complex. Ac-
cumulated direct experience and sometimes inarticulable exper-
30 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:1
tise play a role. 126 Of course, constitutional rights must not be
trampled under the prerogatives of expertise. But institutional
judgment and expertise may tell us something useful about the
proper scope of rights in the first place. It is the universities
and their departments who will tend to be most acutely aware
of many of the complexities and consequences of affirmative ac-
tion, including the program's effects on academic achievement,
the records of graduates, and inter-group relations.
There is certainly a basis in law for judicial deference to
university judgment where rights are at stake. Even Justice
Powell's opinion in Bakke can be read as deferring to an aca-
demic judgment that diversity, including ethnic diversity as a
component thereof, may bring certain educational benefits to a
school. 127 This is not to claim that autonomy of academic judg-
ment or institutional freedom by itself rises to the level of a
compelling governmental interest in the affirmative action con-
text. 28 Again, our aim is merely to bring this consideration into
a cumulative case argument. The crucial underlying point is
that in a cumulative case argument for affirmative action, no
single element need by itself be compelling, or of any particular
degree of independent weight. 129
Judicial deference to academic decision-making, based
partly on differences in institutional competencies, political and
other accountability, and the value of institutional indepen-
dence, has been recognized in the law in several contexts. 30
126. For a classic discussion of this dichotomy, see MICHAEL POLANYI, THE
TACIT DIMENSION (1967).
127. See Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 306 (opinion of
Powell, J.). Cf Strickland, supra note 107, at 746 ("[Dliversity . . . makes for the
most interesting and broadening learning environment for students and faculty.").
128. For discussion, see, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811, 817-21
(E.D. Mich. 2000). For discussion of several of the more general uncertainties un-
derlying what counts as a compelling interest, see Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling
Governmental Interests: An Essential But Unanalyzed Term In Constitutional Ad-
judication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917 (1988).
129. See supra Part II. It may also be true that in some contexts, several
component arguments may be more persuasive than a single unitary argument.
See Paul T. Wangerin, A Multidisciplinarian Analysis of the Structure of Persua-
sive Arguments, 16 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 195, 201 (1993).
130. See, e.g., Bd. of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 91 (1978) ("By and
large, public education in our Nation is committed to the control of state and local
authorities") (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)). Horowitz
was a standards and procedures of academic dismissal case, rather than any sort
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Justice Frankfurter and Justice Harlan classically quoted with
approval a statement of academic freedoms, including a univer-
sity's prerogative to determine "who may be admitted to
study."131 The Court has certainly recognized that "[c]ourts are
particularly ill-equipped to evaluate academic performance."132
Courts have no obvious overall advantage in second guessing
schools on the value of diversity in enhancing the learning envi-
ronment, or on related affirmative action justifications, as those
values are perceived by a university or by democratically ac-
countable overseers. 33
Judicial deference to apparently disinterested affirmative
action admissions decisions would certainly not leave the courts
powerless in a case of old-fashioned discrimination against ra-
cial minorities. 34 Dominant and subordinate groups are, again,
not in generally symmetrical relationships. Most major law
schools and other leading academic institutions would not oper-
ate affirmative action policies without the support of non-mi-
nority academics, whose own ethnic groups do not directly
benefit from affirmative action in the obvious sense, and who do
not selfishly identify with the benefitted minority groups. The
affirmative action practice of enhanced appreciation for those
least like oneself is, again, hardly symmetrical with the com-
mon historical practice of discriminating in favor of one's own
socially dominant ethnic group. 35
of admissions case. See also Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (offi-
cial inquiry into professor's lectures and knowledge of political party as invasion of
academic freedom and free expression).
131. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also Victor G.
Rosenblum, Surveying the Current Legal Landscape for Affirmative Action in Ad-
missions, 27 J.C. & U.L. 709, 723-25 (2001) (discussing Bd. of Regents of Univ. of
Wis. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 232 (2000) ("It is not for the Court to say what is
or is not germane to the ideas to be pursued in an institution of higher learning.")
(addressing the free speech constitutionally of mandatory student activity fee orga-
nizational funding program)).
132. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 92.
133. See Strickland, supra note 107, at 746 (discussing diversity enhancement
of law school admissions procedures).
134. See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
135. A similar point is made in Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE
L.J. 427, 461 (1997). Professor Rubenfeld reports that "[i]f there is a colorable ar-
gument that whites are purposefully reduced to lower-caste status when the pro-
portion of white students at prestigious public universities declines from ninety-
five percent to eighty-five percent, I have yet to hear it." Id. Professor Rubenfeld
adds that "lilf there is a colorable argument that any white person is stamped with
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B. Summarizing the Cumulating Interests in Defending
Affirmative Action
Putting a number of argument components together, then,
it is possible to construct a cumulative case argument in favor of
standard sorts of academic affirmative action. We have consid-
ered argument components of several sorts, occasionally
overlappingly, 136 but also selectively. 137 We have raised, in par-
ticular, more or less distinct arguments focusing on various as-
pects of diversity, 38 remediation,139 compensation, 140 corrective
and distributive justice,' 41 broad utilitarianism, 42 anti-subordi-
nation, 143 integrationism and community preference, 144 and the
value of free and expert academic judgment. 145 Of course, some
of these arguments might be rearranged or combined, but the
underlying pluralism of argument would remain.
There is also the interesting possibility that some of these
elements of the overall affirmative action argument may inter-
act synergistically, rather than simply combining elements in a
crudely arithmetic sort of way. Certainly, separate argument
a badge of status inferiority when a white President and a white Senate appoint a
black man to the Supreme Court in part because of the color of his skin, I have yet
to hear it." Id.
136. See, e.g., supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
137. We have made no attempt to include every argument in favor of affirma-
tive action that is compatible with those listed above. It might be noted that while
affirmative action advocates often discuss the value, in one respect or another, of"role models," we have for the sake of simplicity either set aside such arguments or
incorporated some of the underlying concerns into one or more of the other argu-
ments. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Affirmative Action as a Majoritarian Device: Or,
Do You Really Want to Be a Role Model?, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1222 (1991) (discussing
academic affirmative action as a homeostatic device, often benefitting students in
inverse proportion to need). For discussions of the potential moral value of role
models, see, e.g., EzoRsKY, supra note 88, at 89; Richard Wasserstrom, supra note
108, at 155. For a critique of role model theory, particularly on grounds of lack of
narrow tailoring, see Hopwood v. State, 78 F.3d 932, 942 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (opinion of Powell,
J.)); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274-76 (1986) (plurality opin-
ion). For discussion, see, e.g., Levinson, supra note 64, at 576-77.
138. See sources cited supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
139. See sources cited supra notes 77-87 and accompanying text.
140. See sources cited supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
141. See sources cited supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
142. See sources cited supra notes 97-107 and accompanying text.
143. See sources cited supra notes 108-110 and accompanying text.
144. See sources cited supra notes 112-125 and accompanying text.
145. See sources cited supra notes 126-135 and accompanying text.
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elements raised in the course of ordinary life may take on a ho-
listic quality, in which their combined force exceeds that of the
sum of the parts. Consider, for example, two arguments in
favor of choosing a particular allergist. The first argument or,
as it would be more accurate to say, argument contributor,
might be that Doctor A is a competent, licensed allergist. The
second argument, or argument contributor, might be that Doc-
tor A's practice is geographically within a reasonable travel dis-
tance. These two argument contributors are clearly separate
and distinct.
It seems fair to say that, in isolation, each of these two ar-
gument contributors is of only modest weight in making an ac-
tual final choice among allergists. By itself, though, the first
argument contributor does little to distinctively commend Dr. A
to us. Many allergists are competent and licensed, and most
allergists are inconveniently geographically remote. By itself,
the second argument contributor, that Dr. A's practice is
nearby, is of only modest weight, especially if Dr. A, unlike
other nearby practitioners, is incompetent, or if we know little
about Dr. A's competence.
When these two separate argument contributors are put to-
gether, their combined force is greater than the sum of their
individual strengths. Admittedly, there is less than full interac-
tive synergy between the two argument contributors. It is not
as though proximity somehow would make incompetence trivial
or turn incompetence into a virtue. Nor would mere competence
make geographic distance inconsequential, or even a virtue.
When these two distinct argument contributors are thus
put together, in the sense of being assumed to be simultane-
ously true, we are much closer to seeing Dr. A as a reasonable
final choice as one's allergist. Doubtless we may still want to
consider other matters, such as scheduling or insurance. But if
Dr. A is known to be competent, licensed, and close by, we have
clearly come a substantial distance toward justifying a choice of
Doctor A, and in a way that cannot be fully accounted for by
merely arithmetically combining the two separate argument
contributors.
PACE LAW REVIEW
Can we say that this positive 146 interactivity or synergy ef-
fect is at all paralleled in our cumulative case argument for af-
firmative action? It is important to bear in mind that no true
interactivity of the affirmative action argument contributors
may be necessary. The argument contributors may be of less
than compelling weight when taken in isolation, but of compel-
ling weight when merely fairly and non-duplicatively added up.
Cumulative case arguments may be of irreplaceable value even
in the absence of synergy.
In the case of affirmative action, though, there may actu-
ally be a degree of positive correlation among some of the com-
ponent arguments. One way to look at this would be to say that
in an area as complex, practically significant, morally charged,
and sometimes as emotional as affirmative action, we are likely
to distrust relying on any single, relatively narrow argument.
Focusing on some single argument or theme offers intellectual
convenience. But we are likely to be less than fully convinced
by any single argument, when no single argument can possibly
address the breadth and complexity of the issue. We want an
overall, multidimensional argument that sees the whole pic-
ture, over time, and in all its complexity.
This would mean that we are less likely really to be per-
suaded by any relatively narrow single component argument in
favor of affirmative action, where the argument does not take
into appropriate account all of the relevant historical past, all of
the relevant present, and all of the relevant possible futures.
The most convincing argument on academic affirmative action
will thus look backward as well as forward in a comprehensive,
integrated, consistent way. 147 Such an argument will want to
see the academic institution itself and the broader society in all
contexts and in all relevant fullness.148 We will want to think
procedurally about relative institutional competencies as well
146. It seems possible that two argumented contributors, each of some posi-
tive value, could peculiarly interact in such a way as to negate their own individual
values, even combining to produce a negative value. Consider, for example, that
carbon and oxygen each contribute toward and are indeed necessary for life, but
the combination of the two in the particular form of carbon monoxide may be of
negative net value for life.
147. See sources cited supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
148. See sources cited supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
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as about the various substantive normative issues directly. 149
And this is to ask for just the sort of cumulative case argument
for academic affirmative action we have briefly outlined
above. 150
IV. CUMULATIVE CASE ARGUMENTS AND
NARROW TAILORING
Thus far, we have devoted most of our attention to showing
that it is possible for several less than compelling interests to
combine into a sort of cumulated, or conjunctive, overall inter-
est that might be of compelling weight. This is the most signifi-
cant way in which cumulative case arguments can modify
traditional constitutional analysis.
But it is also extremely important to notice that cumulative
case arguments may call for important changes in the courts'
use of narrow tailoring requirements as well. We have briefly
seen that courts may use the narrow tailoring requirement to
strike down affirmative action programs almost without regard
to the particular features of the affirmative action program. 151
Narrow tailoring analysis is, in general, readily manipulable.
A court might, briefly, find lack of narrow tailoring either
because an affirmative action program involves numerical
goals, or because it does not involve such goals. 15 2 Numerical
goals can be seen as suspiciously like quotas, and, thus, too
rigid. But the absence of numerical goals can be seen as too
open-ended. This sort of tailoring analysis can closely approach
that of "heads I win; tails you lose." This is merely one example
of the sheer manipulability of the narrow tailoring inquiry. 15 3
Interestingly, cumulative case arguments might to some
degree reduce the significance of the judicial narrow tailoring
inquiry precisely because of the multi-facetedness and complex-
149. See sources cited supra notes 126-135 and accompanying text.
150. This is not to suggest that we have comprehensively considered all possi-
ble counterarguments running against academic affirmative action. Our focus has
been mainly on the logic of constructing cumulative case arguments in general,
and on developing a potentially compelling interest in the academic affirmative
action context from constituent elements of arguably lesser individual weight.
151. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
152. For further discussion, in a variety of contexts, of this judicial manipula-
bility, see Wright, supra note 71, at 183-87, 195-98.
153. See id. for additional discussion.
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ity of cumulative case arguments. Currently, courts can simply
choose out of the air some hypothetical alternative government
policy and solemnly declare it to be both feasible and more nar-
rowly tailored than the actual challenged government policy.
Typically, it will not be difficult for a court to conceive of such
an alternative policy. Any court so inclined can on that basis
find lack of narrow tailoring, and thus strike down the govern-
ment policy. 5 4
But a court cannot so easily and casually find lack of nar-
row tailoring where the government's overall argument is cu-
mulative, encompassing multiple distinct interests and
arguments. It is not difficult to simply imagine a more nar-
rowly tailored alternative policy if the court is permitted to fo-
cus exclusively on any single government interest. But a court
faced with a multi-part, perhaps even synergistic, cumulative
argument cannot as casually find lack of narrow tailoring
merely because the government policy is not narrowly tailored
with respect to any one of the various component arguments or
interests.
This is because a sensible government policy may well need
to be less than maximally narrowly tailored in some, or any sin-
gle respect, in order to be maximally narrowly tailored overall,
with respect to all of the interests and component arguments by
which the policy is to be judged. Making the government policy
more narrowly tailored in some respects may mean that the pol-
icy does not promote other interests as well, or promotes them
in a less narrowly tailored way. It is hardly unusual for a policy
aimed at several goals, or justified on several grounds, to be
changed so as to be less burdensome in one respect, but as a
result to be more burdensome, perhaps to other people, in other
respects. Given these obvious tradeoffs and complications, it
may be harder for courts to dismiss a policy as not narrowly
tailored without a correspondingly more complex and serious
discussion.
154. If the costs in time and money of operating the affirmative action compo-
nent of the admissions process are not to be exorbitant, it will commonly be possi-
ble for an unsympathetic court to characterize key stages of even a non-quota
program as unattractively "mechanical" or "inflexible." See, e.g., Johnson v. Bd. of
Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1253-57 (11th Cir. 2001). Automatic ad-
mits based on test scores and grades somehow tend to seem less disturbingly in-
sensitive to the individualities of the applicant.
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Actually, some of these complex tradeoffs in degrees of pol-
icy effectiveness, shifting of costs, and narrowness of tailoring
arise only when a single government interest is thought to be at
stake in a case.155 But these complexities are more obvious and
more difficult to deny in multiple-interest, and especially, cu-
mulative case arguments. If we all appreciate that any alleg-
edly more narrowly tailored alternative will likely have less
narrowly tailored effects on some component interest, it be-
comes more difficult for courts to find a lack of narrow tailoring
in cumulative argument cases without undertaking their own
sustained policy analysis.
In a case in which the government relies only on some sin-
gle, compelling interest, an assumed lack of narrow tailoring
with regard to that interest may seem decisive. But in a cumu-
lative case argument, the overall argument may be compelling
even if no single component of the argument is, itself, compel-
ling. Lack of narrow tailoring with regard to any single compo-
nent argument may be less decisive, and even inevitable. The
narrow tailoring need only be of some overall, inclusive under-
standing of the various interests as a whole. In a sense, a nar-
row tailoring inquiry with regard to a cumulative case
argument could, thus, seek narrow tailoring overall, taking due
account of the various argument components. But the presence
or absence of overall, global narrow tailoring is obviously an es-
pecially complex, easily disputable, and typically subjective
matter, which is not casually resolvable by an untested judicial
assertion in an appellate court opinion.
Suppose, for example, that the government and a court
agree that there are five component arguments or interests un-
derlying some affirmative action policy and that only the con-
junction of all five suffices to constitute a compelling overall
interest. A court can certainly look for some sort of overall nar-
row tailoring in such a case. But it is clear that reasonable per-
155. See, e.g., id. at 1253-57 (The court assumed merely for the sake of argu-
ment that diversity is or can be a compelling governmental interest in the univer-
sity affirmative action context, but then went on, as have other courts, to find the
diversity admissions program to be insufficiently narrowly tailored). Other courts
have followed this pattern of waiting until the narrow tailoring inquiry stage
before finding the particular diversity admissions program unconstitutional. See,
e.g., Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 705 (4th Cir. 1999); Wess-
mann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 794 (1st Cir. 1998).
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sons can and will disagree as to the weights of and relationships
among the component arguments. Different views of what over-
all narrow tailoring requires may be, thus, inevitable and per-
haps equally reasonable. Synergies of various sorts may be
involved. Argument components A and C, for example, may
separately be of little weight apart from their interaction. But
reasonable persons could plainly differ as to such interactive
effects.
All of this in a sense expands the options available to a
court with regard to narrow tailoring. But in an important
sense, the court is more constrained. In a complex cumulative
case, with or without synergies among arguments, it will be all
too obvious that a court may tell a number of stories about the
presence or absence of overall narrow tailoring. And this obvi-
ousness is itself a limitation on judicial arbitrariness. Because
it will always be obviously possible for the court to choose from
a range of, perhaps, equally reasonable stories about narrow
tailoring, any particular story the court chooses to tell will be
less uniquely authoritative or logically binding. In many cases,
a court's opting for some inevitably available story finding lack
of overall narrow tailoring, as opposed to other reasonable and
more sympathetic stories, will seem obviously arbitrary and un-
convincing, and, thus, perhaps less attractive to the court. A
court may wish to make an ideologically driven decision, but not
if the ideological character of the opinion is too painfully
obvious.
This is not to suggest that courts should not find lack of
narrow tailoring in any cumulative case context. A cumulative
case for an affirmative action program that barred the admis-
sion of any and all Caucasians in odd-numbered years would,
presumably, be struck down as insufficiently tailored, regard-
less of how the arguments in favor of affirmative action were
reasonably weighted. Sometimes even the subtle tradeoffs in
narrow tailoring of the component arguments lead us to an ad-
verse overall conclusion. But in less extreme cases, the sheer
obviousness of the possibility of finding any complex govern-
ment policy to lack narrow tailoring, in some respect, may re-
move some of the practical incentive for courts to so find.
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V. CONCLUSION-SOME FINAL SPECULATIONS
Let us conclude with a bit of speculation as to why courts
typically do not recognize the possibility of a cumulative case
argument in favor of any given state policy. Probably the sim-
plest explanation is that legally-trained persons-including
those defending and evaluating state policies-are accustomed
to thinking in other terms. Lawyers do often think in terms of
plural arguments. Pleading may be done in the alternative, 15 6
and the alternative pleas need not be mutually consistent.157
Typically, though, arguments are evaluated separately, in se-
ries, and without regard to any possible holistic or synergistic
effect. Thus, the overall argument is not assumed to be func-
tionally cumulative in character.
Often, no harm arises from considering multiple arguments
as merely a series of separate arguments. Consider, for exam-
ple, the case of Shapiro v. Thompson, 58 in which durational
residency requirements for welfare benefits were held to violate
a constitutional right of interstate travel. 59 In Shapiro, the
Court considered a total of eight distinct arguments or state in-
terests offered in support of the durational residency require-
ments. 160  The Court considered each of these interests
essentially in isolation from the others, apart from the organi-
zational grouping of the arguments by their nature or weight.
The Court in Shapiro was looking, unsuccessfully, for a
compelling government interest underlying the residency re-
quirements that was narrowly tailored to serve that interest.' 6'
In considering the eight arguments separately, the Court re-
156. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2) ("A party may set forth two or more statements
of a claim or defense alternately .... ").
157. See id. ("A party may also state as many separate claims or defenses as
the party has regardless of consistency .... ").
158. 394 U.S. 618 (1969), overruled in part on other grounds, Edelman v. Jor-
dan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
159. See id. at 627.
160. These eight interests included discouraging state entry by those likely to
require assistance. Id. at 627-29. These interests have the effect of discouraging
state entry solely for larger welfare benefits, distinguishing among residents based
on prior tax contributions, preserving the fiscal integrity of state programs, facili-
tating the planning of the welfare budget, minimizing interstate welfare fraud,
and promoting the early entry into the state's labor force by new residents. Id. at
631-34.
161. See id. at 634.
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jected some of the arguments as constitutionally illegitimate.16 2
The rest were deemed legitimate, but in each instance, either
insufficiently weighty or insufficiently narrowly tailored to the
goal of the statutory regulation. 163
When confronted with multiple arguments for a single con-
clusion, a court may mistakenly assume that the individual ar-
guments amount to a chain, and that the chain of the overall
argument is only as strong as its weakest link. The Court
clearly avoided this mistake in Shapiro. It is possible to argue
that the Court did make an opposite mistake of the sort dis-
cussed in this article. The Court did not discuss the possibility
that several merely legitimate, not particularly important state
interests could, if properly related and combined, add up to a
sort of compound interest of sufficient constitutional weight.
The Court in Shapiro might have seen little actual reason to
consider any aggregation of the several merely legitimate inter-
ests cited by the states. The Court, after all, saw those inter-
ests, not only as inconsequential, but as poorly promoted, if
promoted at all, by the durational residency requirements. 6 4 It
seems unlikely that adding up several trivial and only tangen-
tially-pursued interests can somehow generate a compelling
combined interest. The Court's lack of interest in the possibility
of somehow aggregating one or more legitimate165 interests into
a jointly compelling interest may, under the particular circum-
stance of Shapiro, have been harmless, even if not fully
justified.
But more generally, courts should be sensitive to what Ste-
phen Toulmin, the distinguished exponent of informal logic, has
referred to as "the versatility of reason." 66 Legal arguments
can take different forms and should be evaluated according to
162. See id. at 627, 629.
163. See id. at 627, 631-38.
164. See id. at 633-38.
165. It seems technically possible that two illegitimate interests might some-
how interactively affect one another so as to jointly result in an actually legiti-
mate, if not compelling, interest. Two poisons, such as sodium and chlorine, may
in the presence of one another produce an item essential for life. However, in the
absence of an example of this phenomenon in the affirmative action area, we shall
simply ignore this possibility.
166. STEPHEN E. TOULMIN, AN EXAMINATION OF THE PLACE OF REASON IN ETH-
iCs 82 (1950) (reprint ed. 1968).
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their form. To treat a cumulative case argument for affirmative
action as though it could be fairly reduced to the pursuit of some
single goal would simply be judicially irresponsible.

